ABSTRACT. The purpose of this paper is to prove a new topological fixed point theorem by using the connectedness property, and next existence of equilibria in generalized games are established as applications.
INTRODUCTION
In many problems of nonlinear functional analysis and applied mathematics, the fixed point technique is a very useful tool for proving the existence of solutions. And we have known many interesting fixed point theorems and their applications, e.g. see Browder [1] , Fan [2] , Mehta and Tarafdar [3] , Tan and Yuan [4] .
The classical fixed point theorem, due to Fan and Browder 1,2], is as follows. Let X be a non-empty compact convex subset of a Hausdorff topological vector space E and let T:X 2 x be a multimap such that for each x q. X, TIx is non-empty convex and for each /6 X, T -1 (F) is open in X. Then there exists 6 X such that 6 T().
In the above, the convexity assumption is very essential and the main proving tool is the continuous selection technique. Still there have been many equivalent formulations of the above theorem, and also many generalizations and applications have been established, e.g. see [3, 4, 5] .
In this paper, we shall give a new existence theorem by using the topological property of convex sets We first prove a new fixed point theorem by using the connectedness, and next prove a basic existence theorem. Finally equilibrium existence theorems are established as applications.
PRELIMINARIES
We first recall the following notations and definitions. Let A be a non-empty set. We shall denote by 2 the family of all subsets of A. Let X, Y be non-empty topological spaces and T:X 2 Y be a multimap. For a given multimap T X 2v, z X is called a manmal element for T if T(z) .I ndeed, in real applications, the maximal element may be interpreted as the set of those objects in X that are the "best" or "largest" choices.
Finally we recall the following definitions of equilibrium theory in mathematical economics. Let I be a finite or an infinite set of agents. For each E I, let Xi be a non-empty set of actions A generalized game F (X,, A,, P)I is defined as a family of ordered triples (X,, A,, P) where X is a non-empty topological space (a choice set), A, 1-IseiX 2 x, is a constraint correspondence (multimap) and P YIeiX 2 x, is a preference correspondence. An equilibrium for P is a point $ X 1-I,X, such that for each I, $, Ai($) and Ai($) P,() . In particular, when I (1, ..-,n}, we may call l" an N-person game.
A NEW FIXED POINT THEOREM
We begin with the following: THEOREM 1. Let X be a non-empty connected subset of a Hausdorff topological space E and S, T X 2 be multimaps such that (1) S is a closed selection ofT, i.e. S is a closed multimap and S(z) C T(z) for each z E X, In particular, if /0 X, then we have V0 T(/0). This completes the proof.
We can reformulate Theorem to the following existence of maximal element: COROLLARY. Let X be a non-empty connected subset of a Hausdorff topological space E and T X ---, 2 x be closed at every x where T(z) = , such that
(1) T-(/0) is non-empty open in X for some /0 E X,
Then T has a maximal element E X, i.e. T() .
PROOF. Suppose T(z) for each z X. Then by Theorem 1, /0 T(z) for each x X, and this contradicts assumption (2) . Therefore T has a maximal element.
As we remarked before, maximal element theorem is a very essential tool for proving existence theorems in mathematical economics, e.g. see [3, 4, 5] .
In Theorem Therefore, by Theorem 1, we can find a fixed point for T. And it should be noted that the domain of T and some T(x) are not convex, so that many lown fixed point theorenis (e.g. [1, 2, 3, 5, 6 ] cannot be suitable for T.
EXISTENCE OF EQUILIBRIA
As an application, we first give an existence theorem of equilibrium for 1-person game THEOREM 3. Let (X, A, P) be a 1-person game such that
(1) X is a non-empty connected subset ofa Hausdorfftopological space, (2) the correspondence A X ---, 2 x is closed such that A(x) is connected for some x X, (3) the correspondence P" X --, 2 x is closed at every z where A(x) P(x) : , (2) and (4), using Theorem 2, there exists a non-empty subset K C X such that A(x) K for each x (f X. Then by assumption (2) again, K is connected and the set {:v E X-x E A(:)) is exactly equal to K. We now consider a multimap A C P K 2 K defined by (A N P)(z) :--A(z) N P(x) for each :c 6 K.
In fact, (A N P)(z) P(z) K for each z 6 K. Then by assumptions (2) and (3), A N P is closed at every z where A(x) N P(m) t. Therefore the whole assumptions ofthe Corollary are satisfied, so that there exists some 6 K such that A() N P() .T herefore is the desired equilibrium choice for F.
In the above, when A(z)= X for each :v 6 X, we can obtain the previous Corollary as an application. And, by modifying the method in [4, 5] , we can generalize Theorem 3 to N-person game or generalized games with infinitely many agents.
We shall need the following result which can be found in Aubin and Cellina [7] : LEMMA. Let X and Y be regular topological spaces and T" X 2 Y be an upper semicontinuous multimap such that for each x E X, T(x) is non-empty closed. Then T is a closed multimap.
Finally, using different assumptions from Theorem 3, we can obtain the following existence of equilibrium for N-person game:
THEOREM 4. Let F (X,, A,, P,),e be a generalized game where I {1,.-.,n} is a finite set of agents such that for each I, 
